A new methodology for climate action: fair, democratic, effective

by: Yannis Eustathopoulos

---

April 30, 2025

---

The green transition represents a complex and large-scale transformation, involving not only technological innovation but also profound social, economic, institutional, and cultural change. Its implementation cannot be approached as a purely technical challenge¹; rather, it requires the integration of interdisciplinary knowledge—including insights from the social sciences and humanities—alongside empirical attention to local contexts and sustained engagement with the diverse communities and professional groups implicated in its unfolding. Within this framework, the ENA Sustainable Development Observatory (SDO) has systematically explored the uneven impacts of climate policies, with a focus on emerging patterns of social, spatial, and institutional inequality. Such policies, if not carefully designed and monitored, risk entrenching existing disparities or generating new forms of exclusion². The SDO’s strategic approach has been grounded in a justice-oriented perspective on sustainability transitions, attending in particular to distributive, procedural, and recognitional dimensions of justice. This article synthesises the key findings of the SDO’s 2024 work programme, which critically examined the social and spatial dimensions of the green transition. The findings affirm that without long-term, socially embedded support, such transformations are unlikely to be either effective or durable.

The green transition: uncertainties, contradictions and challenges

Support for the green transition remains significant at European level and in most Member States, at least in terms of long-term political commitments and institutional discourse. However, there is a growing risk that it will be eroded under the pressure of the international political context, geopolitical developments and shifting political priorities, for example, towards increased defence spending, strategic autonomy or strengthening the international competitiveness of European industry³. In this context, climate and environmental policies run the risk of being subordinated to both the logic of competitiveness and to budgetary constraints, leading to a reduction in resources for innovative actions with a strong socio-environmental impact. While recent EU priorities – such as the recommendation to reduce carbon emissions by 90% by 2040 compared to 1990 levels – provide a clear strategic framework towards climate neutrality, there is still a significant gap between planning and implementation, including the critical issue of the 'investment gap'. At the same time, mounting political pressure to ease climate commitments is giving rise to the risk of adopting controversial instruments which, rather than advancing genuine mitigation, raise growing concerns over potential greenwashing practices — such as international carbon credits or carbon capture and storage solutions (CCS). Moreover, these policies do not adequately address the social and spatial inequalities that accompany the transition, despite the establishment of important instruments such as the Just Transition Mechanism and the Social Climate Fund. In countries such as Greece, where energy poverty is widespread and structural weaknesses hamper effective policy implementation, there is growing public concern about the potential impact of the ETS2 on the most vulnerable consumers and regions – despite the availability of substantial resources from the Social Climate Fund to mitigate these impacts. These concerns are compounded by the risk of ineffective use of available funds, often exacerbated by a lack of meaningful consultation with affected communities. In light of the above, the green transition is inextricably linked to broader transformations necessitated by the grand challenges of the modern era, in particular addressing growing income and wealth inequalities. In the international arena, demands are emerging such as fair taxation of great wealth, framing the market with capable institutions for long-term planning and financing of sustainable development⁴ and industrial policy institutions, limiting the power of oligopolies including in the digital economy and rebuilding the welfare state on the basis of a new social-ecological contract⁵.

At the same time, the green transition is being openly challenged internationally by populist political forces, that are exploiting the existing weaknesses in climate policy to undermine public support for it. In an environment of growing income inequality, increasing energy poverty, a steady loss of purchasing power, climate disinformation campaigns and a deteriorating public sphere, marked by declining quality and civic participation , social and occupational groups – such as young people, farmers and workers in carbon-intensive industries – are becoming particularly vulnerable to organised anti-climate campaigns. These narratives challenge the political feasibility and necessity of the transition and contribute to the erosion of social support for environmental policies.

Exclusions, inequalities and costs of the ecological transition as the new "normality”

These attitudes, observed in Greece and across Europe, are largely due to the way certain aspects of the transition have been managed on the ground: the exclusion of citizens from meaningful participation in environmental decision-making processes; the concentration of financial benefits in powerful corporate actors, mainly large energy companies; the regressive distributional impacts of mitigation policies such as the carbon tax⁶; the worsening indicators of energy poverty and the implementation of green projects of industrial-scale without prior consultation or even basic information of local communities. At the same time, the cost of acquiring green technologies such as electric vehicles, smart technologies or rooftop solar photovoltaics⁷) (partly due to lack of home ownership limits access to the benefits of the energy transition for a significant part of the population. This unequal access can reinforce social inequalities and indirectly create norms of environmental and technological 'normality' that tend to marginalise households with limited financial means. Paradoxically, the working class derives fewer symbolic benefits from environmental mainstreaming than the privileged social classes, even though they contribute less to pollution and suffer more from the consequences of environmental policies due to the greater pressure to 'green' their lifestyles than the rest of the population⁸. In addition, public authorities are providing greater support to the wealthy in the adoption of green technologies and products (e.g. tax incentives and subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles and the energy renovation of buildings, exemptions from vehicle excise duties), while at the same time implementing measures that disproportionately shift the burden of the required effort onto poorer households (low emission zones that exclude the most polluting vehicles, higher vehicle excise duties, implementation of the ETS2, etc.). Under these circumstances, part of the population – and especially the lower income groups – perceives the green transition not as an opportunity, but as a threat, a source of social stigma and injustice, or as a top-down imposition.

A new modus operandi for climate action

Managing and addressing social reactions to climate change mitigation policies requires the acceptance of a commonly accepted framework for dialogue to find solutions that are compatible with the common good. At the heart of this framework is the recognition of the urgent need for immediate and decisive action in the face of the climate crisis. Unscientific approaches that deny the anthropogenic causes of the crisis or seek to downplay its severity cannot form an acceptable basis for discussion. While local opposition to green infrastructure projects may be based on valid arguments, all regions must contribute to the achievement of the climate goals by accepting investments in renewable energy sources within the limits of their capabilities and specificities. Otherwise, the exclusion of some regions from the transition will lead to climate injustice, as investments in fossil fuels are maintained and the resulting environmental, economic and social costs are passed on:

1. Other communities – either because they host polluting activities, or because they are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, such as an increase in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events (e.g. floods, droughts, desertification, heat waves, forest fires).
2. Social groups that are more dependent on fossil fuel products in a context of volatile and rising prices leading to increasing energy poverty.
3. The Greek economy, due to a high deficit in the fuel balance, accounting for about 21% of the country's trade deficit in 2024. This dependence entails a significant opportunity cost, as valuable resources – public or private – are diverted to fuel imports, at the expense of investments with high social and environmental benefits, such as energy efficiency and small-scale renewable energy projects, investments in the restoration of natural ecosystems and the development of collective infrastructure for resilience and climate change adaption⁹.

Conversely, approaches that a priori discredit and stigmatise any form of response as a "Not-In-My-Back-Yard" (NIMBY) syndrome, prove counterproductive in ensuring the political feasibility of transition; inadequate in understanding the sources of social discontent; and ineffective in building a broader consensus in the long-term public interest. Excluding local communities from the public debate is an approach that is, by definition, incompatible with the concept of a just transition. In many cases, social resistance is the result of a lack of trust in institutions, as well as accumulated negative experiences of opacity or environmental degradation from previous large-scale projects. The management of local resources – including water, soil, biomass and energy – is increasingly recognised as a critical challenge in the spatial planning dimension of the green transition in several European countries. In France, for example, initiatives are being implemented to mitigate the risks associated with local tensions over the use of natural resources, particularly in the context of decarbonisation and climate adaptation policies¹⁰. Initiatives such as ateliers collaboratifs (collaborative workshops) aim to support mediation and informed decision-making at both local and national levels, while promoting multi-level governance and cooperation across territorial scales¹¹.

In summary, any case of social tension or contestation – whether at the public or local level (e.g. a new environmental policy, an industrial-scale green investment project or a controversial untested green technology) - requires in-depth analysis. This enables informed and objective conclusions to be drawn, solutions to be implemented that serve the public interest, and a new public policy methodology for climate action to be established that is effective, decisive and sustainable precisely because it is based on participation and fairness. The challenge is therefore to establish a new operational framework – a modus operandi for the transition – that combines national, European and global climate commitments with democratic participation, local and social cohesion, a fair distribution of burdens and benefits, and the principle of shared responsibility.

The Just Transition in practice: Policy Priorities

Without underestimating objective difficulties, the project is politically feasible, albeit challenging. Positive experiences, emerging trends, innovative ideas and policy interventions are already being recorded and are highlighted in the SDO Special issue on Energy and Climate Justice, building on previous work and publications. Adapting these experiences to the national and local contexts requires strong political will, quality public institutions and services for policy design, implementation and evaluation, as well as the activation of citizens by restoring their trust in institutions.

Indicatively, the following areas of intervention are proposed:

• Promoting fair green taxation, based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities of companies and citizens towards the planet. The principle of climate justice legitimises the imposition of high environmental taxes on the 1% of the world's economic elite since this small percentage of the population is responsible for 16% of global carbon emissions - equivalent to 66% of the emissions of the poorest part of humanity, i.e. about 5 billion people¹².
• Eliminate the distortions in the Greek energy market that favour excessive corporate profits at the expense of society as a whole and the Right to Energy.
• Restore public intervention in the utilities sector, in particular with regard to the development and modernisation of electricity networks, activate the untapped potential of regulatory authorities to regulate utilities—such as energy, water and transports—in the general interest¹³ and use development banks to support sustainable development objectives¹⁴.
• Promote accessible and clean public transport and implement energy-efficient and climate-resilient housing programmes for all.
• Strengthen institutions of energy democracy, such as energy communities , with a catalytic role for local governments, and support self-generation of energy from renewable sources.
• Rethinking spatial planning of renewable energy infrastructure in relation to agricultural production, natural ecosystems and local sustainable development strategies.
• The institutionalisation and support of permanent structures for consultation and democratic planning – based on European best practice – with substantial scope for participation of municipalities and local communities.¹⁵
• Strengthening environmental education in schools, but also in workplaces, local communities and public administration, and implementing strategies against climate disinformation in public discourse.
• Establish a framework for sustainable and equitable reconstruction after disasters caused by extreme weather events, based on the "Build Back Better" principle of the Sendai Framework.

The Way Forward: Popular ecology as a pillar of a just green transition

The implementation of these policies requires the formation of broader social alliances capable of advocating for and supporting them in the long term. Broadening the social and political base of the green transition and its overall democratic legitimacy is therefore crucial to its effectiveness. One of the most widespread stereotypes surrounding sustainable development is the perception that it is an area of interest only to the middle and upper social classes – as a reflection of their value system. This perception ignores the deeply rooted practices and cultural norms of the working and low-income groups, which are not only consistent with the goals of the green transition¹⁶, but often precede it. Many of the principles of the green transition -such as the circular economy, sustainable consumption, reuse, self-sufficiency and sustainable food- are deeply rooted in the historical memory, popular culture and everyday practices of the working and rural classes. Practices of repairs, recycling and reuse practices in the countryside and the traditional Mediterranean diet highlight an ecological tradition that is not the result of policy imposition or consumer fashion, but a way of life, embedded in social memory and the need for resilience and collective action. Overall, broad social support for climate action requires it to be reimagined through the needs and demands of the grassroots. This can only be achieved through an emancipatory ecological discourse that starts from the experiences, concerns and priorities of the popular classes. Such an approach constitutes an inclusive 'popular ecology' that opposes individualism and environmental policies limited exclusively to market solutions. At the heart of this approach are structural interventions for social justice and environmental sustainability, such as universal access to clean and quality public transport, energy security through clean and democratically controlled energy sources, and ensuring decent, energy-efficient and climate-resilient housing for all.

---